The Normative Sciences, the Sign Universe, Self-Control and Rationality – According to Peirce by Sí¸rensen, Bent & Thellefsen, Torkild Leo
www.cosmosandhistory.org 142
Cosmos and History: The Journal of  Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 1, 2010
The NormaTive ScieNceS, The 
SigN UNiverSe, Self-coNTrol aNd 
raTioNaliTy—accordiNg To Peirce 
Bent Sørensen and Torkild leo Thellefsen
AbstrAct: although charles S. Peirce, strictly speaking, never formulated a ‘full-blown’ 
normative theory—a single over-all architectonic system—we believe that there lies within his 
work a valuable sketch of the ideal for feeling, action, and thought, and how this ideal should 
be followed, and in connection to this, Peirce offered a model for rational behaviour, including 
self-control. in the following essay we will try, modestly, to draw a rough outline of this sketch. 
firstly, we will focus on the three normative sciences, their relationship and their task of finding 
out how feeling, action and thought ought to be controlled. Then, we will take a look at the 
sign-universe. The very universe is a sign-universe and within this evolutionary universe feeling, 
matter and thought incessantly melt together into ‘concrete reasonableness’; according to Peirce, 
rendering the world more reasonable. This is the Summum Bonum that man can and indeed 
should pursue. hence it makes absolutely no sense to speak of the three normative sciences out 
of this metaphysical or cosmological context. finally, we will try to see in what way rationality 
can be said to fall within the spheres of self-control, bearing in mind that self-control is directly 
related to conditional purpose.
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it is somehow more than a mere figure of speech to say that na-
ture fecundates the mind of man with ideas which, when these ideas 
grow up, will resemble their father, Nature (charles S. Peirce, 1898).
iNTrodUcTioN
around 1890, the american polyhistor c. S. Peirce (1839-1914) began to work on the 
manuscript ‘a guess at the riddle’. The riddle, to which the title refers, is the one de-
scribed by Peirce´s contemporary, a fellow american, the philosopher, lecturer, essayist 
and poet r. W. emerson (1803-1882) in his famous and celebrated poem ‘The Sphinx’. 
it is the very riddle of the universe: or the intricate relation between mind and matter; 
but also the purpose of man’s life, how he ought to live (cf. Sheriff, 1994, p. xvii). Peirce 
never finished his work ‘a guess at the riddle’. however, several places in his specula-
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tive philosophy bear witness to his optimism about man’s ability to find an ideal worth 
pursuing—the Summum Bonum. according to Peirce, man is able to take on an (aesthetic) 
ideal, which he finds in the sign-universe—the fact that there is a growth in concrete 
reasonableness, which is the course of evolution itself. man experiences and knows the 
universe because he himself is a result of its creative processes; he has evolved to a point 
where he can live rationally and with it exercise self-control;1 or in other words, man 
can cultivate his habits of feeling, action and thinking in accordance with the ideal. 
Understanding these efforts of cultivation fall within Peirce’s three normative sciences: 
aesthetics, ethics, and logic. But Peirce developed very little in the way of a systematic 
aesthetics or ethics; yet he did extensive work in logic. as Peirce himself said in one of his 
‘lectures on Pragmatism’ (1903): ‘my own opinions of ethics and aesthetics are far less 
matured than my logical opinions’.2 although Peirce, strictly speaking, never formulat-
ed a ‘full-blown’ normative theory—a single over-all architectonic system – we believe 
that there lies within his work a valuable sketch of the ideal for man and how it should 
be followed, and in connection to this, a model for rational behaviour, including self-
control3. in the following we will try, modestly, to draw a rough outline of this sketch. 
The article progresses in the following way: firstly, we will focus on the three norma-
tive sciences, their order of independence and dependence and their task of finding out 
how feeling, action and thought ought to be controlled. Then, we will take a look at the 
sign-universe. The very universe is a sign-universe and within this evolutionary universe 
feeling, matter and thought incessantly melt together into ‘concrete reasonableness’; ac-
cording to Peirce, rendering the world more reasonable is exactly the Summum Bonum, 
which man can and indeed should pursue; hence it makes absolutely no sense to speak 
of the three normative sciences outside this metaphysical or cosmological context. fi-
nally, we will try to see in what way rationality can be said to fall within the spheres of 
self-control, bearing in mind that self-control is directly related to conditional purpose.
The Three NormaTive ScieNceS 
according to Peirce the three normative sciences aesthetics, ethics and logic study ‘what 
ought to be’, not ‘what is’.4 ‘What ought to be’ involves ideals, ends and purposes,5 and 
is of course related to concepts such as deliberate action and self-control. Thus taken 
together the three normative sciences can be understood as an attempt to formulate a 
unifying model regarding self-control with close affinity to rationality.6 it took a while 
though before Peirce came to the conclusion that there are three normative sciences and 
     1. v.g. Potter, Charles S Peirce on Norms and Ideals, fordham University Press, New york, 1997, p. 202
     2. c. S. Peirce, Collected Papers (abbr. cP followed by volume and paragraph no.) vol. 1-6 (c. hartshorne & 
P. Weiss, eds.), harvard University Press, cambridge, (cP: 5.129) 
     3. cf. c. hookway, ‘Sentiment and Self-control’, in J. Brunning & P. forster (eds.), The Rule of  Reasoning, 
Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1997, p. 225.
     4. cf. cP: 1.281
     5. v.g. Potter, Charles S Peirce on Norms and Ideals, fordham University Press, New york, 1997, p. 25
     6. cf. c. hookway, ‘Sentiment and Self-control’, in J. Brunning & P. forster (eds.), The Rule of  Reasoning, 
Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1997, p. 202
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that these enter into a certain order of dependence. however, he was never in doubt 
that logic—defined as the theory regarding the intended form of reasoning7—is a nor-
mative science while ethics and aesthetics were not deemed worthy of being labelled 
normative sciences; Peirce saw ethics as being an art or a practical science  which, like 
taste, could not be discussed. But in his fourth ‘lecture on Pragmatism’ (1903), the 
mature Peirce had changed his mind: 
But when, beginning in 1883, i came to read the works of the great moralists, 
whose great fertility of thought i found in wonderful contrast to the sterility of the 
logicians—i was forced to recognize the dependence of logic upon ethics; and 
then took refuge in the idea that there was no science of esthetics, that, because de 
gustibus non est disputandum, therefore there is no esthetic truth and falsity or generally 
valid goodness and badness. But i did not remain of this opinion long. i soon came 
to see that this whole objection rests upon a fundamental misconception. To say 
that morality, in the last resort, comes to an esthetic judgment is not hedonism.8 
in this way, ethics became endowed with the predicate normative science, and it 
was—according to Peirce—an unavoidable propaedeutic to logic. But this was not 
enough. aesthetics completed the normative sciences, and was no less than the sci-
ence on which conclusions both logic and ethics must build.9 in his harvard lecture 
‘on Phenomenology’ (1903) Peirce put forth the following definition of the three nor-
mative sciences: …the research into the theory of the distinction between what is 
good and what is bad; in the realm of cognition, in the realm of action, and in the 
realm of feeling.10 The normative sciences rest upon the premise that feeling, action, 
and reasoning—to a certain degree—are subject to self-control. Therefore, the task 
of the normative sciences consists in finding out how these ought to be controlled. 
in the ‘lowell lectures’ (1903), where Peirce discussed what right reasoning and the 
right action consist in, he also noted the following regarding the order of dependence 
between the normative sciences: 
What does right reasoning consist in? it consists in such reasoning as shall be 
conducive to our ultimate aim. What, then, is our ultimate aim? Perhaps it is 
not necessary that the logician should answer this question. Perhaps it might be 
possible to deduce the correct rules of reasoning from the mere assumption that 
we have some ultimate aim. But i cannot see how this could be done. if we had, 
for example, no other aim than the pleasure of the moment, we should fall back 
into the same absence of any logic that the fallacious argument would lead to. 
We should have no ideal of reasoning, and consequently no norm. it seems to me 
that the logician ought to recognize what our ultimate aim is. it would seem to 
be the business of the moralist to find this out, and that the logician has to accept 
the teaching of ethics in this regard. But the moralist, as far as i can make it out, 
     7. c. S. Peirce, The essential Peirce, vol. 1-2 (abbr. eP i or eP ii) (N. houser & c.J. Kloesel, eds), indiana 
University Press, Bloomington 1992-1998, eP ii p. 376.
     8. cP: 5.111
     9. cf. J.J. Stuhr, ‘rendering the World more reasonable’, in h. Parret (ed.), Peirce and Value Theory, John 
Benjamins, Philidelphia, 1993, p. 5-6.  
     10. eP ii: 147
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merely tells us that we have a power of self-control, that no narrow or selfish 
aim can ever prove satisfactory, that the only satisfactory aim is the broadest, 
highest, and most general possible aim; and for any more definite information, as 
i conceive the matter, he has to refer us to the esthetician, whose business it is to 
say what is the state of things which is most admirable in itself regardless of any 
ulterior reason. 11 
Thus logic can be understood as the study of correct reasoning, and correct reason-
ing consists of reasoning which follows an ultimate goal. according to Peirce rea-
soning concerns the part of the inferential process that can be made the object of 
conscious control and thereby of criticism and correction. in ‘minute logic’ (1901-
02), Peirce wrote: 
for reasoning is essentially a voluntary act, over which we exercise control. if it 
were not so, logic would be of no use at all. for logic is, in the main, criticism 
of reasoning as good or bad. Now it is idle so to criticize an operation which is 
beyond all control, correction, or improvement.12 
if logic should be able to articulate its normative function, it has to formulate a criteria 
for how one ought to reason; this is a question about validity: is one’s reasoning good or 
is it bad? however, this criteria rests upon conclusions regarding the objective ideal for 
reasoning itself. These conclusions can only be localized within the normative science 
ethics and aesthetics.13 regarding the object of ethics, Peirce stressed again in ‘minute 
logic’ (1901-1902): 
We are too apt to define ethics to ourselves as the science of right and wrong. That 
cannot be correct, for the reason that right and wrong are ethical conceptions 
which it is the business of that science to develop and to justify. a science cannot 
have for its fundamental problem to distribute objects among categories of its 
own creation; for underlying that problem must be the task of establishing those 
categories. The fundamental problem of ethics is not, therefore, What is right, 
but, What am i prepared deliberately to accept as the statement of what i want 
to do, what am i to aim at, what am i after? To what is the force of my will to 
be directed?14
Thus, normative ethics is not the science about what is right and what is wrong; rather 
it investigates what one ought to be ready to take on as an ideal for one’s actions. in con-
nection with this, logic rests upon the normative ethics since:
logic is a study of the means of attaining the end of thought. it cannot solve that 
problem until it clearly knows what that end is. life can have but one end. it is 
ethics which defines that end. it is, therefore, impossible to be thoroughly and 
rationally logical except upon an ethical basis.15 
     11. cP: 1.611
     12. cP: 2.144
     13. T.v. curley, the relation of the normative sciences to Peirce’s theory of inquiry. Transactions of  the Charles 
S. Peirce Society, 5 (2), 1969, p. 93.
     14. cP: 2.198
     15. cP: 2.198
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But what is the ultimate ideal of action? What is the ideal which reasonably should be 
intentionally assumed? according to Peirce, as he stressed in ‘lectures in Pragmatism’ 
(1903), this can only be: 
a state of things that reasonably recommends itself in itself aside from any ulterior 
consideration. it must be an admirable ideal, having the only kind of goodness 
that such an ideal can have; namely, esthetic goodness. from this point of view the 
morally good appears as a particular species of the esthetically good.16
in this way ethics depends on normative aesthetics, since we, in Peirce’s words from 
‘lectures on Pragmatism’, ‘cannot get any clue to the secrets of ethics… until we first 
have made up our formula for what it is that we are prepared to admire’.17 aesthetics, 
which is the science about what is admirably in it self, identifies the ideal, which the 
ethical action ought to follow; the means to reach the goal belongs to logic, which deals 
with self-controlled reasoning. But if the ethical action and the logical goodness have to 
be intended, the ideal must be a habit of feeling, which is developed under the influence 
of self-criticism and hetero-criticism. That is, a habit of feeling is general, it can be iden-
tified and thus controlled and criticized and thereby corrected; this is the most impor-
tant task of aesthetics, and in this way it articulates its normative function.18 
The UNiverSe of SigNS
But it absolutely makes no sense to speak about the three normative sciences unless we 
with Peirce understand that man is a being which is informed by the telos of reasonable-
ness; man has a unique place in the evolutionary sign-universe, a sign-universe in which 
an inherent ideal can be localized, a Summum Bonum, which man can and indeed should 
pursue. The life of man is everywhere perfused with semeiosis; without signs man can 
neither perceive, feel, act, or think 19. concerning the latter, Peirce argued this case in 
his article ‘Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man’ (1868): 
if we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which we can find 
are of thought in signs. Plainly, no other thought can be evidenced by external 
facts. But we have seen that only by external facts can thought be known at all. 
The only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But 
thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. all thought, therefore, must 
necessarily be in signs.20 
in other words, reasoning is only evidenced by external facts; the object of reasoning is 
external facts. external facts are mediated by signs, thus all reasoning is in signs. What 
argument could falsify this? in his lucid work ‘vitenskab og ‘menneskebilde’, the Nor-
wegian philosopher and Peirce-scholar P. Skagestad writes: 
     16. cP: 5.130
     17. cP: 5.36
     18. v.g. Potter, Charles S Peirce on Norms and Ideals, fordham University Press, New york, 1997, p.50-51
     19. cf. cP 7.591
     20. cP: 5.251
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To be able to refute the thesis an opponent must be able to refer to at least one 
thought, which does not have linguistic thought but he would not be able to 
refer to any thought without putting it into words. all thoughts, which can be 
identified, confirm the thesis, and we are unable to identify any thoughts which 
could refute it.21 
Signs can, rightfully, turn to man and say, as Peirce wrote in the article ‘Some conse-
quences of four incapacities’’ (1868): ‘you mean nothing which we have not taught you, 
and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought’.22 
indeed, man does not only use the sign, the sign is identical to man in the same way as 
homo and man are identical. as Peirce argued in his article ‘consequences’: 
it is that the … sign which man uses is the man himself. for, as the fact that every 
thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, 
proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign, proves that 
man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, 
in the same sense in which the words homo and man are identical. Thus my 
language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought.23 
Thus, the identity of man consists in the consistency of his reasoning and actions ex-
pressed as a semeiotic relation: ‘consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that 
is, is its expressing something’.24 however, semeiosis is not only limited to the world of 
man, also the entire organic world is filled with thought, as Peirce wrote in ‘Prolegom-
ena to an apology for Pragmaticism’ (1906): 
Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. it appears in the work of bees, 
of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny 
that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really 
there. consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven 
to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to fichte’s. Not only is thought in the 
organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a general without 
instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here 
give ‘Sign’ a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within 
our definition.25 
indeed, the entire universe seems to be perfused with signs and sememiosis. in ‘issues of 
Pragmaticism’ (1905), Peirce stressed how: 
the entire universe—not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider 
universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we 
are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth’—that all this universe is perfused with 
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.26 
     21. P. Skagestad, Vitenskap och Menneskebilde: Peirce og amerikansk pragmatisme. Universitetsforlaget, oslo, 
Tankekorsserien, 1978, p. 48-49, our translation.
     22. cP: 5.313
     23. cP: 5.314
     24. cP: 5.315
     25. cP: 4.551
     26. cP: 5.448, note 1
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hence, Peirce took on a pan-semeiotic view of the universe; to him a sign is not a thing 
amongst others. That is, the universe does not consist of two exclusive things, signs and 
non-signs; there cannot be anything which in principle cannot be a sign.27 if we take a 
closer look at the universe, we will see that it in fact is one big sign, a tremendous argu-
ment and thereby intelligible, since an argument is, as Peirce wrote in the manuscript 
‘Nomenclature and divisions of Triadic relations, as far as they are determined’ (c. 
1903): a sign of law,28 that is ‘the law that the passage from all such premises to such 
conclusions tends to the truth’.29 in the manuscript ‘lectures on Pragmatism’, lecture 
iv (1903), Peirce wrote: 
The Universe is a vast representamen … an argument. … [The] total effect is 
beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of 
parts of the whole—which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary 
Qualities that belong to the premises.30 
The intelligibleness of the universe is increased concurrently with the process of evolu-
tion, which is a growth in the concrete reasonableness, as Peirce called it; that is the se-
meiotic order in which the universe grows or Thirdness, the tendency to take habits in 
all its variations (cf. esposito, 1980, p. 167). Thus, as Peirce described in the article ‘Prag-
matic and Pragmatism’ (1903), his cosmology rests upon the metaphysical condition: 
The coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the 
becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process 
of the growth of reasonableness.31 
SuMMuM BoNuM aNd The aBiliTy of maN To exerciSe  
Self-coNTrol 
Peirce coupled the growth in the concrete reasonableness with Summum Bonum, the 
highest good, which he stressed in the monist article ‘What Pragmatism is’ (1905): 
The pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but 
makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more 
and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, 
which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. in its higher 
stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control, and 
this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for making the rational purport 
to be general.32 
evolution is not a value neutral process; rather it has close affinity to an aesthetic-moral 
ideal; man ought to strive for having his semeiosises develop in accordance with the de-
     27. cf. m.h. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max Fisch, K.l. Ketner & c.J. Kloesel (eds.), 
indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1986, p. 330. 
     28. cP: 2.310
     29. cP: 2.263
     30. cP: 5.119
     31. cP: 5.4
     32. cP: 5.433
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velopment of the universe. only if man tries to contribute to the reasonabless of the uni-
verse, he can find his true place in it. in ‘lowell lectures’ (1903), Peirce stressed: 
The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, 
in the year 4004 B.c., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very 
development of reason. … The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an 
ulterior reason is reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can 
comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our 
little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering 
the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is ‘up to us’ to do so.33 
in his excellent book Charles S. Peirce: on Norms and Ideals, the Peirce scholar v. g. Potter 
wrote about the Peircean conditions for man’s participation in rendering the universe 
more reasonable. here the ability to self-control is of utmost importance: 
man … holds a privileged and unique place in this evolving world. although he 
himself is a product of that process of development and still is in great measure 
subject to it, he has reached a stage where he is capable of a very high degree 
of self-control. … man has evolved to a point where he now can cooperate in 
evolution itself, since he can deliberately control his own actions and influence the 
society of which he is member.34 
man displays rational behaviour so far as he is able to control his feelings, actions 
and thoughts in a certain way in concordance with the Summun Bonum.35 in a non-
published manuscript, Peirce stressed how the most important task consists in finding 
out how: 
feeling, conduct, and Thought, ought to be controlled supposing them to be 
in a measure, and only in a measure, to self-control, exercised by means of self-
criticism, and the purposive formation of habit, as common sense tells us they are 
in a measure controllable.36 
man is capable of criticising his own feelings, actions and thoughts; he is capable of 
comparing these to a standard, he is able to investigate whether these match a certain 
intension or not, he can investigate whether these cause a sense of satisfaction or dissat-
isfaction; he can learn from experience; he can make his standard object for revision or 
maybe even abandon it, and as a result, he can develop a new habit formation.37 Thus, 
man can conduct self-control within three main areas: conduct of ‘aesthetical’ self-con-
trol, which relates to thought’s control over feeling; ‘ethical’ self-control, which relates to 
thought’s control over action; and, ‘logical’ self-control, which relates to reasoning’s con-
     33. cP: 1.615
     34. v.g. Potter, Charles S Peirce on Norms and Ideals, fordham University Press, New york, 1997, p. 202.
     35. cf. c. hookway, ‘Sentiment and Self-control’. in J. Brunning & P. forster (eds.), The Rule of  Reasoning, 
Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1997, p. 202.
     36. Peirce unpublished manuscript 655; quoted in J.J. Stuhr, ‘rendering the World more reasonable’, in: 
h. Parret (ed.), Peirce and Value Theory, John Benjamins, Philidelphia, 1993, p. 12.
     37. cf. c. misak, C. S. Peirce on vital matters. The cambridge companion to Peirce, cambridge University 
Press, cambridge, 2004, p. 171.
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trol over thought.38 These three forms follow the same intricate development as Peirce 
described in the manuscript ‘Pragmatism’ (c. 1903) concerning the phases of self-control: 
of course there are inhibitions and coördinations that entirely escape consciousness. 
There are, in the next place, modes of self-control which seem quite instinctive. 
Next, there is a kind of self-control which results from training. Next, a man can 
be his own training-master and thus control his self-control. When this point is 
reached much or all the training may be conducted in imagination. When a man 
trains himself, thus controlling control, he must have some moral rule in view, 
however special and irrational it may be. But next he may undertake to improve 
this rule; that is, to exercise a control over his control of control. To do this he must 
have in view something higher than an irrational rule. he must have some sort of 
moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an esthetic ideal 
of what is fine.39 
instead of investigating the rational consciousness as a kind of kernel, Peirce tried to 
understand self-control as a series of phases. of course Peirce was well aware—as the 
fallibilist he was—that he hardly had found all phases, still there seems to appear an 
interesting continuum ranging from instinctive self-control to self-control, where the 
most general law is controlled in accordance to an aesthetic ideal. The continuum cor-
responds with the grade of consciousness. according to Peirce, consciousness makes up 
a system of three—and only three, as his categorial logic prescribes—classes of general 
elements, named feeling, alter-sense and medi-sense, respectively. in an unnamed man-
uscript (c. 1900) Peirce wrote: 
There are no other forms of consciousness except ... feeling, altersense, and 
medisense. They form a sort of system. feeling is the momentarily present 
contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. 
it is consciousness in its first state, and might be called primisense. altersense is the 
consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. medisense is 
the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense 
leading from the former to the latter. it is the consciousness of a process of bringing 
to mind.40 
in what way this consciousness trichotomy more precisely can be correlated with the 
continuum, is not easy to decide. Thus, let us be content with giving a couple of facts. 
The highest grades of self-control are connected with medi-sense and thereby with the 
form of self-consciousness where thoughts, actions, feelings, intentions, decisions and 
the single parts of the body become whole; the past is connected to the future, deci-
sions are connected and form a plan; plans are connected and form a life; all this hap-
pens with reference to a certain unit, a sign-relation, the self; the self, who thinks these 
thoughts, who carries out actions, feels this or that and have these intentions, and so 
     38. T.l. Short, ‘hypostatic abstraction in self-consciousness’, in J. Brunning & P. forster (eds.), The Rule of  
Reasoning, Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1997, p. 301.
     39. cP: 5.533
     40. cP: 7.551
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forth.41 The lowest grades of self-control is connected to feeling and instinct; thus the 
ability to self-control and rational reasoning is not limited by these; feeling and instinct 
is rather a fundament for the higher grades of self-control, as Peirce said in the lecture 
‘detached ideas on vitally important Topics’ (1898): 
it is the instincts, the sentiments, that make the substance of the soul. cognition is 
only its surface, its locus of contact with what is external to it.42 
man is endowed with a form of emotional rationality; he has the ability to cognize from 
his disposition to feel; what is valuable seems to be immediately felt and cognized.43 The 
possibility for man to develop his full rational nature is not only related to his ability 
to cultivate his habits of thought and action but also to his habits of feeling, or else he 
cannot pursue Summum Bonum. 
a feW coNclUdiNg ThoUghTS
from a Peircean perspective man lives in a universe perfused with semeiosis. it is not 
incomprehensible that man can understand this universe; he himself has emerged from 
its creative processes and there is a structural affinity between his reasoning and the rea-
soning that takes place within the universe. Thus, by aid of his ability for self-control, 
man can encircle the ultimately admirable, which his feelings, actions, and reasoning 
then ought to follow. in other words, if the ultimately admirable can be encircled, it is 
also possible to encircle what is good regarding the habits of feeling, action, and reason-
ing; good logic relates to reasoning, which is self-controlled and which contributes to 
the ultimately admirably, in the same way as good ethics relates to action, which is self-
controlled and which contributes to the ultimately admirable. finally a good aesthetic is 
that which creates a habit of feeling, which causes good actions and good thoughts44 (cf. 
Sheriff, 1994, p. 66). The three normative sciences make up a framework for self-con-
trol and rationality; these sciences are important when it comes to understanding man’s 
strivings to pursue the Summum Bonum. man should contribute to rendering the universe 
more reasonable, this much and nothing less.
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